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FIRE (AND POLICE) DEPARTMENTS
LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT RESPONSE
By Sidney D. Hemsley
Senior Legal Consultant
Under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act municipalities are liable for the negligence of
their employees, with some exceptions. One of those exceptions is “discretionary functions”
(Tennessee Code Annotated (T.C.A.) 29-20-205). However, the act does not define that term.
The Tennessee Supreme Court has grappled with both a definition and application of the term
in Gordon, et al. vs. City of Henderson, 766 S.W.2d 784 (1988). Although that case involved
the delivery of municipal fire services, it contains some language that should cause Tennessee
municipalities to look closely at the manner in which they deliver all public safety services.
Several plaintiffs sued the City of Henderson on the grounds that negligence of the Henderson
Fire Department was responsible for the deaths of four people. They complained that:
1. The firemen were absent from their duty stations and had to be located by the Henderson
Police Department;
2. The response time of the firemen was 15 minutes when it should have been five minutes;
3. Some of the responding firemen had the smell of liquor on their breaths and were “unable to
respond as trained and professional firemen;” and
4. The firemen placed their equipment in operation incorrectly.
The plaintiffs never had an opportunity to prove their case. The Court dismissed their complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals upheld the
dismissal, reasoning that the four acts of which the plaintiffs complained were “discretionary
functions” for which the City of Henderson was not liable under the Tennessee Governmental Tort
Liability Act.
The Court of Appeals was at least partially wrong, declared the Tennessee Supreme Court. The
Court noted that while the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act does not define the term
“discretionary function,” it had previously defined the term under the common law as:
Where the duty is absolute, certain, and imperative, and is simply ministerial, the
officer is liable in damages to anyone specially injured, either by his omitting to
perform the task or by performing it negligently or unskillfully. On the other hand,
where his powers are discretionary, and to be exerted or withheld according to his
own judgment, he is not liable to any private person for a neglect to exercise those
powers, nor for the consequences of a willful exercise of them, where no corruption
or malice can be imputed to him, and he keeps within the scope of his authority.
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Under that definition, the Court concluded that “while
upon a full development of the facts, some of the acts of
the firemen complained of could logically be classified as
‘discretionary functions’,”
… we find it difficult to categorize the
apparent intoxication of firemen as a
‘discretionary function,’ nor, without an
explanation of defendants, the absence of
firemen from their duty station and the
resultant delay in response time.

First, the Court’s application of its definition of
“discretionary function” narrows and has the potential
to lead to a further judicial narrowing of the range of
acts on the part of low-ranking and non-policy-making
employees that can be classed as “discretionary
functions.” At first glance it may seem both legally sound
and just to declare that the intoxication of firemen or their
absence from their duty stations are not “discretionary
functions.” But that declaration may open a Pandora’s
box of complaints concerning the individual and collective
mental and physical condition of public safety personnel,
and staffing and deployment decisions that affect their
response times and the quality of their service. The Court
appears to have left some deployment decisions within
the category of “discretionary functions.” But it takes
little imagination to see that the Court’s language is an
invitation to test every deployment decision that does
not result in a perfect or textbook outcome.1

The Court relied in part on an Alabama Supreme Court
opinion that a plaintiff was entitled to a trial on the
question of whether the City of Tuscumbia was liable for
a house destroyed by a fire. The plaintiff in that case
alleged that the loss was caused by a delay in the
response of the fire department arising from the failure
of the department to replace an engine driver who had
gone home sick. The deployment of firefighting resources
can involve a discretionary function, said the Alabama
Supreme Court, but:
We opine in this case a duty was imposed on
the Tuscumbia Fire Department to respond
immediately to the call that the [plaintiff’s]
house was on fire. There was a special duty
created to act in a skillful manner to respond
to the call. We recognize that firemen may
act with extreme skillfulness and yet be
unable to get to a fire to prevent a building
from burning to the ground. But, here, the
complaint alleges that the reason the fire
department did not immediately respond was
that the driver of the truck had gone home
sick and had not been replaced. We opine
that the fire department acted unskillfully
by not having a back-up driver who could
have immediately taken the place of the
sick driver; … in other words, the fire
department lacked proficiency.

Second, and perhaps most important, the Court’s
reliance upon the “special relationship” doctrine used
by the Alabama Supreme Court probably erodes the
doctrine that a fire (or police) department owes no duty
to a particular individual. Under the rapidly developing
“special duty” or “special relationship” doctrine, police
and fire departments can, by the conduct of their
employees, create a duty to aid or protect a
particular individual.
The courts are not in agreement on what it takes to
create a special duty or relationship. Generally, cases
on that subject require conduct on the part of public
safety personnel that rises to the level of a promise to
Since this bulletin was first published in 1991, the Tennessee
Supreme Court has adopted the planning-operational test to
determine whether an act is discretionary (Bowers vs. City of
Chattanooga, 826 S.W. 2d 427 (Tenn. 1992)). Under this test,
acts that rise to the level of planning or policy making are
considered discretionary and are clothed with immunity.
Operational acts, on the other hand, can engender liability. In
determining whether to impose liability for a particular act,
courts will look, not necessarily to the particular actor, but to the
decision-making process and the propriety of judicial review of
the resulting decision. The acts that gave rise to liability in the
Henderson case would probably have been denominated
operational under this test. Therefore, the result would probably
have been the same.

1

City of Henderson appears to have expanded two
related avenues of recovery by plaintiffs alleging injury
through the negligent acts of public safety (and possibly
other) municipal employees.
2
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help or protect a particular individual and reliance by
that individual on that promise. Other cases add a
requirement that the individual claiming injury through
the breach of the promise to help or protect must have
suffered the injury while in the physical custody, or
control of, public safety personnel. However, this case
suggests that a special duty or relationship can be created
very easily, possibly by little more than the promise of
help or protection created by the existence of a public
safety department.2
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How far these two related avenues of recovery will
be expanded remains to be seen. However, wise
municipalities will consider that City of Henderson puts
them on notice that if they maintain and operate municipal
fire and police services, the fire fighters and police
officers whose duty it is to respond to calls for help or
protection must respond skillfully and proficiently. If they
do not, the municipality that employs them might be held
liable under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability
Act for injuries arising from their negligent response.
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Since this bulletin was first published, the Tennessee Supreme
Court has listed the situations that give rise to a special duty or
relationship and, thus, to liability:
1. Officials, by their actions, affirmatively undertake to
protect the plaintiff, and the plaintiff relies upon the
undertaking; or
2. A statute specifically provides for a cause of action
against an official or municipality for injuries resulting to
a particular class of individuals, of which the plaintiff is a
member, from failure to enforce certain laws; or
3. The plaintiff alleges a cause of action involving intent,
malice, or reckless misconduct (Ezell vs. Cockrell, 902
S.W. 2d 394 (Tenn. 1995)).
Under this definition of special duty or relationship, the only
portion that some of the acts in the Henderson case might fall
under is the reckless misconduct provision of the third item.
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